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Un détecteur de fautes pour les plates-formes
HPC
Résumé : Ce travail présente un détecteur de fautes pour plates-formes
HPC. Ce détecteur maintient et diffuse la liste des ressources vivantes en temps
logarithmique dans le pire cas, et ce même si un nombre non borné de fautes
survient dans la plate-forme, à condition toutefois que celles-ci ne soient pas
trop rapprochées dans le temps. De nombreuses simulations et expériences sur le
supercalculateur Titan à ORNL montrent toute la performance et la scalabilité
de notre algorithme.
Mots-clés : MPI: Détecteur de fautes; Tolérance aux pannes.
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1 Introduction
Failure detection is a prerequisite to failure mitigation and a key component of
any infrastructure that requires resilience. This paper is devoted to the design
and evaluation of a reliable algorithm that will maintain and distribute the
updated list of alive resources with a guaranteed maximum delay. We consider
a typical high performance computing (HPC) platform in steady-state operation
mode. Because in such environments the transmission time can be considered
as bounded (although that bound is unknown), it becomes possible to provide
a perfect failure detector according to the classical definition of [1]. A failure
detector is a distributed service able to return the state of any node, alive or
dead (subject to a crash)1. A failure detector is perfect if any node death
is eventually suspected by all surviving nodes, and if no surviving node ever
suspects a node that is still alive. Critical fault-tolerant algorithms for HPC and
implementations of communication middleware for unreliable systems rely on
the strong properties of perfect failure detectors (see e.g. [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]). Their
cost in terms of computation and communication overhead, as well as their
properties in terms of latency to detect and notify failures and of reliability,
have thus a significant impact on the overall performance of a fault-tolerant
HPC solution.
While we focus primarily on of one the most widely used programming
paradigms, the Message Passing Interface (MPI), the techniques and algorithms
proposed have a larger scope, and are applicable in any resilient distributed pro-
gramming environment. We consider the platform as being initially composed
of N nodes, but with a high probability, some of these resources will become
unavailable throughout the execution. When exposed to the death of a node,
traditional applications would abort. However, the applications that we con-
sider, are augmented with fault-tolerant extensions that allow them to continue
across failures (e.g., [7]), either using a generic or an application-specific fault-
tolerant model. The design of this model is outside the scope of this paper, but
without loss of generality, we can safely assume that any fault-tolerant recovery
model requires a robust fault detection mechanism. Our goal is to design such
a robust protocol that can detect all failures and enable the efficient repair of
the execution platform.
By repairing the platform, we mean that all surviving nodes will eventually
be notified of all failures, and will therefore be able to compute the list of
surviving nodes. The state of the platform where all dead nodes are known to
all processes is called a stable configuration (note that nodes may not be aware
that they are in a stable configuration).
By robust, we mean that regardless of the length of the execution, if a set
of up to f failures disrupt the platform and precipitate it into an unstable con-
figuration, the protocol will bring the platform back into a stable configuration
within T (f) time units –we will define T (f) later in the paper. Note that the
goal is not to tolerate up to f failures overall. On the contrary, the protocol
1We use the words failure and death indifferently.
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will tolerate an arbitrary number of failures throughout an unbounded-length
execution, provided that no more than f successive overlapping failures strike
within the T (f) time-window. Hence, f induces a constraint on the frequency
of failures, but not on the total number of failures.
By efficiently, we aim at a low-overhead protocol that limits the number of
messages exchanged to detect the faults and repair the platform. While we as-
sume a fully connected platform (any node may communicate with any other),
we use a realistic one-port communication model [8], where a node can send
and/or receive at most one message at any time-step. Independent commu-
nications, involving distinct sender/receiver pairs, can take place in parallel;
however, two messages sent by the same node will be serialized. Note that
the one-port model is only an assumption used to model the performance and
provide an upper bound for the overheads. In real situations where platforms
support multi port communications, our algorithm is capable of taking advan-
tage of such capabilities.
All these goals seem contradictory but they only call for a carefully designed
trade-off. As shown in [9, 10, 11], system noise created by the messages and
computations of the fault-detection mechanism can impose significant overheads
in HPC applications; hence, the efficiency of the approach must be carefully as-
sessed. The overhead should be kept minimal in the absence of failures, while
failure detection and propagation should execute quickly, which usually implies
a robust broadcast operation that introduces many messages. The major con-
tributions of this work are as follows:
• It provides a proven algorithm for failure detection based on a robust protocol
that tolerates an arbitrary number of failures, provided that no more than f
consecutive failures strike within a time window of duration T (f).
• The protocol has minimal overhead in failure-free operation, with a unique
observer per node.
• The protocol achieves failure detection and propagation in logarithmic time
for up to fmax = blog nc − 1 where n is the number of alive nodes. More pre-
cisely, the bound T (fmax) is deterministic, and logarithmic in n, even in the
worst case.
• All performance guarantees are expressed within a realistic one-port commu-
nication model.
• It provides a detailed theoretical and practical comparison with randomized
protocols.
• Extensive simulations and experiments with ULFM [7] show very good per-
formance of the algorithm.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We start with an informal
description of the algorithm in Section 2. We detail the model, the proof of
correctness and the time-performance analysis in Section 3. Then we assess the
efficiency of the algorithm in a practical setting, first by reporting on a com-
prehensive set of simulations in Section 4, and then by discussing experimental
results on the ORNL Titan supercomputer in Section 5. Section 6 provides
an overview of related work. Finally, we outline conclusions and directions for
Inria
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future work in Section 7.
Platform parameters
N Initial number of nodes
τ Upper bound on the time to transfer a message
Protocol parameters
η Period for heartbeats
δ Time-out for suspecting a failure
Table 1: List of Notations.
2 Algorithm
This section provides an informal description of the algorithm. See Table 1 for
a list of main notations. We refer to Section 3 for a detailed presentation of the
model, a proof of correctness and a time-performance analysis. We maintain
two main invariants in the algorithm:
1. Each alive node maintains its own list of known dead resources.
2. Alive nodes are arranged along a ring and each node observes its predeces-
sor in the ring. In other words, the successor/observer receives heartbeats
from its predecessor/emitter (see below).
When a node dies, its observer broadcasts the information and reconnects the
ring: from now on, the observer will observe the last known predecessor (ac-
counting for locally known failures) of its former predecessor. The rationale for
using a ring for detection is to reduce the overhead in the failure-free case: with
only one observer, a minimal number of heartbeat messages have to be sent.
We use the protocol suggested in [12] for fault detection. Consider a node q
observing a node p. The observed node p is also called the emitter, because it
emits periodic heartbeat messages m1,m2, . . . at time σ1, σ2, . . . to its observer
q, every η time units. Now let σ′i = σi + δ. At any time t ∈ [σ′i, σ′i+1), q trusts
p if it has received heartbeat mi or higher. Here, δ is the time-out after which
q suspects the failure of p. Assume there are initially N alive nodes numbered
from 0 to N−1, and node i+1 mod N observes node i according to the previous
protocol, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1. Tasks T1 and T2 in Algorithm 1 execute this
basic observation node, with the time-out delay being reset upon reception of a
heartbeat. Note that [12] shows that this protocol, where the emitter sponta-
neously sends heartbeats to its observer, exhibits better performance than the
variant where observers reply to heartbeat requests.
What happens when an observer (node i) suspects the death of its prede-
cessor in the ring? Task T3 in Algorithm 1 implements two actions. First, it
updates the local list Di of dead nodes with the identity of its emitter and then
reconnects the ring (lines 19 to 23); and second, it initiates a reliable broad-
cast informing all nodes in its current list of alive nodes about the death of its
predecessor (line 24).
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The first action, namely the reconnection of the ring, is taken care of by the
procedure FindEmitter(Di): node i searches its list of dead resources Di and
finds the first (believed) alive node, j, preceding it in the ring. It assigns j as its
new emitter and sends a message NewObserver informing j that i has become
its observer. Node i also sets a timeout to 2δ time units, a period after which
it will suspect its new emitter, j, if it has not received any heartbeat. Task T4
implements the corresponding action at the emitter side.
The second action for node i is the broadcast of the death to all alive nodes
(according to its current list). A message BcastMsg(dead, i,Di) containing the
identity of the dead node dead, the source of the broadcast i, and the locally
known list of dead nodes Di is broadcast to all alive nodes (according to the
current knowledge of node i). We now detail how this procedure works. Let A
be the complement of Di in {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, and let n = |A|. The elements of
A are labeled from 0 to n− 1, where the source i of the broadcast is labeled 0.
The broadcast is tagged with a unique identifier and involves only nodes of the
labeled list A (this list is computable at each participant as Di is part of the
message). Because n is not necessarily a power of two, we have a complication2.
Letting k = blog nc (all logarithms are in base 2), we have 2k ≤ n < 2k+1.
We use twice the reliable hypercube broadcast algorithm (HBA) of [13]. The
first HBA call is from the source (label 0) to the subcube of nodes j, where
0 ≤ j ≤ 2k, and the second HBA call is from the same source (label 0) to the
subcube of nodes n−j mod n, where 0 ≤ j ≤ 2k. Each HBA call thus involves a
complete hypercube of 2k nodes, and their union covers all n nodes (with some
overlap). The HBA algorithm delivers multiple copies of the broadcast message
through disjoint paths to all the nodes in the system. Each node executes a
recursive doubling algorithm and propagates the received information to up to
k participants ahead of it, located at distance 2k for 0 ≤ j ≤ 2k. For simplicity
we refer to both HBA calls as a single broadcast in our algorithm.
Upon reception of a broadcast message including a source s and a list of dead
nodes D, any alive node i can reconnect the complement list A of nodes involved
in the broadcast operation and their labels, and then compute the ordered set
of neighbors Neighbors(s,D) to which it will then forward the message. We
stress that the same list D, or equivalently the same set of participating nodes,
is used throughout the broadcast operation, even though some intermediate
nodes might have a different knowledge of dead and alive nodes. This feature is
essential to preserving fault tolerance in the algorithm of [13]. Indeed, we know
from [13] that each hypercube broadcast is guaranteed to complete provided
that there are no more than k − 1 dead nodes within participating nodes (set
A) while the broadcast executes.
2Delay-bounded fault-tolerant broadcasts are not easily obtained for arbitrary values of n.
See the discussion in Section 6.2.
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Algorithm 1 Sketch of the failure detector for node i.
1: task Initialization
2: emitteri ← (i− 1) mod N
3: observeri ← (i+ 1) mod N
4: HB-Timeout← η
5: Susp-Timeout← δ
6: Di ← ∅
7: end task
8:
9: task T1: When HB-Timeout expires
10: HB-Timeout← η
11: Send heartbeat(i) to observeri
12: end task
13:
14: task T2: upon reception of heartbeat(emitteri)
15: Susp-Timeout← δ
16: end task
17:
18: task T3: When Susp-Timeout expires
19: Susp-Timeout← 2δ
20: Di ← Di ∪ emitteri
21: dead← emitteri
22: emitteri ← FindEmitter(Di)
23: Send NewObserver(i) to emitteri
24: Send BcastMsg(dead, i,Di) to Neighbors(i,Di)
25: end task
26:
27: task T4: upon reception of NewObserver(j)
28: observeri ← j
29: HB-Timeout← 0
30: end task
31:
32: task T5: upon reception of BcastMsg(dead, s,D)
33: Di ← Di ∪ {dead}
34: Send BcastMsg(dead, s,D) to Neighbors(s,D)
35: end task
36:
37: function FindEmitter(Di)
38: k ← emitteri
39: while k ∈ Di do
40: k ← (k − 1) mod N
41: return k
42: end function
RR n° 9024
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3 Model & Performance Analysis
This section provides a detailed presentation of the model and a proof of cor-
rectness of the algorithm, together with a worst-case time-performance analysis.
We also present a comparison with randomized protocols for observing processes
and detecting failures.
3.1 Model
3.1.1 General Framework
Nodes can communicate by sending messages in communication channels, ex-
pected to be lossless and not ordered. Any node can send a message to any
other node. Messages in the communication channel (p, q) take a random time
Tp,q to be delivered, which has an upper bound τ . We consider executions where
nodes can die permanently at any time. If a node p dies, then all communication
channels to p are emptied; p does not send any message nor execute any local
assignment.
Note that τ is a property of the platformthat represents the maximal time
that separates a process entering a send operation and the destination process
having the corresponding message ready to read in its memory. While the
exact value for τ is generally unknown, it can be bounded in our case using
the techniques described in Section 5.1. The algorithm uses δ > τ as a bound
to define the limit after which a node is suspected dead. Tuning the value of
δ as close as possible to τ–without underestimating τ to guarantee that false
positives are not detected– is an operation that must be fitted for each target
platform. Thus, in the theoretical analysis, we use τ to evaluate the worst case
of a communication that succeeds, while the algorithm must rely on δ to detect
a failure.
3.1.2 Using the One-Port Model
While we assume a fully connected platform (any node may communicate with
any other), we use a realistic one-port communication model [8] where a node
can send and/or receive at most one message at any time-step. Independent
communications involving distinct sender/receiver pairs can take place in par-
allel; however, two messages involving the same node will be serialized. Using
the one-port model while aiming at a low-overhead protocol is a key motivation
to this work. It is not realistic to assume that each node would observe any
other node, or even a large subset of nodes. While this would greatly facilitate
the diffusion of knowledge about a new death and speed up the transition back
to a stable configuration, it would also incur a tremendous overhead in terms of
heartbeat messages, and in the end dramatically impact the throughput of the
platform.
Because all messages within our algorithm have a small size, we model our
communications using a constant time τ to send a message from one node to
another. We could have used a traditional model such as LogP or a start-up
Inria
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overhead plus a time proportional to the message size, but since we use this only
as an upper bound, this would unnecessarily complicate the analysis. Under the
one-port model, the HBA algorithm [13] with 2k nodes executes in 2kτ , provided
that no more than k − 1 deaths strike during its execution. The time for one
complete broadcast algorithm in Algorithm 1 would then be (upper bounded
by) 4τ log n in the absence of any other messages, since we use two HBA calls
in sequence. But our algorithm also requires heartbeats to be sent along the
ring, as well as NewObserver messages when ring reconnection is needed.
Assuming that η ≥ 3τ (where η is the heartbeat period), we can always insert
broadcast and NewObserver messages in between two successive heartbeats,
thereby guaranteeing that a broadcast in Algorithm 1 will always execute within
B(n) = 8τ log n, assuming no new failure interrupts the broadcast operation.
3.1.3 Stable Configuration and Stabilization Time
Here we consider executions that, from the initial configuration, reached a steady
state before a failure hit the system and made it leave that steady state. To
prove the correctness of our algorithm, we show that in a given time the system
returns to a steady state, assuming that no more than a bounded number of
failures strike during this time.
Connected Node A node p is connected with its successor in a configuration,
if p is alive and emitterp is the closest predecessor of p that is alive (on the
ring). It is connected with its predecessor if it is alive, and observerp is the
closest successor of p that is alive in that configuration. It is reconnected if
it is connected with both its successor and predecessor. If all processors are
reconnected, we say the ring is reconnected.
Stable Configuration A configuration C is the global state of all processes
plus the status of the network. A configuration is declared as stable, if any alive
node p is reconnected in C and for any node q, q ∈ Dp ⇐⇒ q is dead in C.
Stabilization Time T (f), with f being the number of overlapping failures,
is the duration of the longest sequence of non stable configurations during any
execution, assuming at most f failures during the sequence.
3.2 Correctness and Performance Analysis
The main result is the following proof of correctness that provides a deterministic
upper bound on the Stabilization Time T (f) of the algorithm with at most f
overlapping faults:
Theorem 1. With n ≤ N alive nodes, and for any f ≤ blog nc − 1, we have
T (f) ≤ f(f + 1)δ + fτ + f(f + 1)
2
B(n) (1)
where B(n) = 8τ log n.
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This upper bound is pessimistic for many reasons, which are discussed after
the proof. But the key point is that the algorithm tolerates up to blog nc − 1
overlapping failures in logarithmic time O((log n)3).
Proof. Starting from a nonstable configuration, the next stable configuration
will be reached when (i) all nodes are informed of the different failures via the
broadcast, and (ii) processes of the ring are reconnected. Recall that every
time a node has detected a failure, it initiates a broadcast that executes within
B = B(n) = 8τ log n time units, and which is guaranteed to reach all alive
nodes as long as f ≤ blog nc − 1. Because we interleave reconnection messages
within the broadcast, B encompasses both the broadcast and the reconnection.
However, due to the one-port model, we cannot assume anything about the
pipelining of several consecutive broadcast operations. In this proof, we make a
first simplification by over-approximating T (f) as the maximum time R(f) to
reconnect the ring after f overlapping failures, plus the time to execute all the
broadcasts that were initiated, in sequence (assuming no overlap at all). We
prove an upper bound on R(f) by induction, letting R(0) = 0:
Lemma 1. For 1 ≤ f ≤ blog nc − 1, we have
R(f) ≤ R(f − 1) + 2fδ + τ (2)
Proof. We first prove Equation (2) when f = 1. Assume that node p, observed
by node q, fails. After receiving the last heartbeat, q needs δ time units to detect
the failure (line 15 of Algorithm 1). Thus, the worst possible scenario is when
p fails right after sending a heartbeat, which will take τ time units to reach q.
Thus q detects the failure after τ+δ time units. Finally, q sends the reconnection
message to the predecessor of p, which will take τ , hence R(1) ≤ 2τ+δ. We keep
the over-approximation R(1) ≤ τ + 2δ to simplify the formula in the general
case.
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Figure 1: Segments of dead nodes after f = 3 failures: n = 9, k = 2, I1 = {2, 3}, I2 = {5},
d1 = 2 and d2 = 1.
Assume now that Equation (2) holds for all f ≤ blog nc − 2. Now consider
an execution with f + 1 overlapping failures, the first of them striking at time
Inria
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0 (see Figure 2). The (f + 1)-th failure strikes at time t. Necessarily t ≤ R(f);
otherwise, the ring would have been reconnected after f failures, and the last
one would not be overlapping. There are f dead nodes just before time t among
the original n alive nodes, which define k ≤ f segments Ii, 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Here,
segment Ii is an interval of di ≥ 1 consecutive dead nodes (see Figure 1). Of
course
∑k
i=1 di = f , and there remain n − f alive nodes. There are multiple
cases depending upon which node is struck by the (f + 1)-th failure at time t:
• The new failure strikes a node that is neither a predecessor nor a successor
of a segment (e.g., the failure strikes node 7 in Figure 1). In that case, a
new segment of length 1 is created, and the ring is reconnected at time
t+R(1).
• The new failure strikes a node p that precedes a segment Ii. Let q be the
successor of the last dead node in Ii. By definition, q 6= p. There are two
sub-cases:
– The predecessor p′ of p is still alive (e.g., the failure strikes node 1
preceding segment I1 in Figure 1, q = 4 and p
′ = 0 is alive). Then
the size of segment Ii is increased by one. In the worst case, q is not
aware of the death of any node in Ii at time t, and needs to probe
all these nodes one after the other before reconnecting with p′ (in
the example, q = 4 needs to try to reconnect with 2 and 1 since it
is not aware of their death). This costs at most (di + 1)(2δ) + τ ≤
2(f + 1)δ + τ , because di + 1 ≤ f + 1, hence the ring is reconnected
at time t+ 2(f + 1)δ + τ .
– The predecessor p′ of p is dead (e.g., the failure strikes node 4 pre-
ceding segment I2 in Figure 1, q = 6 and p
′ = 3 is dead). Then
p′ is the last node of another segment Ij . In that case, segments Ii
and Ij are merged into a new segment of size di + dj + 1 ≤ f + 1.
Just as before, in the worst case, q is not aware of the death of
any node in that new segment, and the reconnection costs at most
(di+dj +1)(2δ)+ τ ≤ 2(f +1)δ+ τ (see Figure 2 for an illustration).
Hence the ring is reconnected at time t+ 2(f + 1)δ + τ .
• The new failure strikes a node p that follows a segment Ii. Let q be the
successor of p. If q is alive, it now follows a segment of size di + 1. If q is
the first dead node of segment Ij , let r be the node that follows Ij . Now
r follows a segment of size di + dj + 1. In both cases, we conclude just as
before.
This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
From Lemma 1, we easily derive by induction that
R(f) ≤ f(f + 1)δ + fτ
for all values of f ≤ blog nc − 1. During the ring reconnection, processes that
discover a dead process initiate a broadcast of that information. We need to
count, in the worst case, how many broadcasts are initiated to compute how
long it takes for the information to be delivered to all nodes.
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Lemma 2. Let pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ f ≤ blog nc − 1 be the i − th process subject of a
failure. In the worst case, at most f − i+ 1 processes can detect the death of pi.
Proof. A process p is discovered dead by process q in Task T3, if emitterq = p.
In that case, p is added to Dq, and emitterq is re-computed using FindEmitter.
That function cannot return any process in Dq, and p is never removed from
Dq. Thus, q will never discover the death of p again. As long as q lives, no
other process q′ will execute the task T3 with emitterq′ = p, because q is an
alive process between q′ and p in the ring. Thus, q must fail after p, for p to
be discovered once more. Since there are at most f faults, pi, the i − th dead
process can thus be discovered dead by at most f − i+ 1 processes.
We immediately have that:
Corollary 1. At most
∑f
i=1(f − i+ 1) =
f(f+1)
2 broadcasts are initiated.
Finally, the information on the f dead nodes must reach all alive nodes. For
each segment Ii, there is a last failure after which the broadcast initiated by the
observing process is not interrupted by new failures. That broadcast operation
thus succeeds in delivering the list of newly discovered dead processes to all
others (di ≤ blog nc − 1). In the worst case, that broadcast operation is the
last to complete. As already mentioned, we conservatively consider that all the
broadcast operations execute in sequence, and since there are at most f(f+1)2
broadcast operations initiated (Corollary 1), we derive that
T (f) ≤ R(f) + f(f + 1)
2
B(n)
which leads to the upper bound in Equation (1) and concludes the proof of
Theorem 1.
We derive from Lemma 2 that at most
∑f
i=1(f − i+ 1) =
f(f+1)
2 broadcasts
are initiated. Finally, the information on the f dead nodes must reach all alive
nodes. For each segment Ii, there is a last failure after which the broadcast
initiated by the observing process is not interrupted by new failures. That
broadcast operation thus succeeds in delivering the list of newly discovered
dead processes to all others (di ≤ blog nc−1). In the worst case, that broadcast
operation is the last to complete. As already mentioned, we conservatively
consider that all the broadcast operations execute in sequence. Since there
are at most f(f+1)2 broadcast operations initiated , we obtain T (f) ≤ R(f) +
f(f+1)
2 B(n), which leads to the upper bound in Equation (1) and concludes the
proof of Theorem 1.
The bound on T (f) given by Equation (1) is quite pessimistic. We can iden-
tify three levels of complexity with their corresponding bounds on T (f). In the
most likely scenario, where the time between two consecutive faults is larger
than T (1), the system has time to return to a stable configuration before the
second fault, in which case all faults can be considered as independent, and
Inria
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0 4 . . .21 3
HB
τ + δ ≤ 2δ to detect the
failure of 3
NO 4 detects failure of 2 after 2δ
This failure increases the size
of segment I1 = {3} by
one, now I1 = {3, 2}
NO 4 detects failure of 1 after 2δ
This failure increases the size
of the segment I1 = {3, 2} by
one, now I1 = {3, 2, 1}
NO
Ring reconnected
HB
B(n)
B(n)
B(n)
Bcast
Broadcast messages of the
failure of processes 3, 2 and 1
T (3, C)
HB=heartbeat
NO=NewObserver
Bcast=Broadcast Operation
Figure 2: From stable configuration C, growing segment I1 of Figure 1: first failure on node
3, next two failures striking its ring predecessors.
the average stabilization time is T (1) = R(1) + B(n) = O(log n). If the sys-
tem suffers quickly overlapping faults, the location of impacted nodes becomes
important. However, the larger the platform, the smaller the probability that
successive faults strike consecutive nodes (2/n, where n is the number of alive
nodes). Thus, on large platforms, overlapping failures are more likely to strike
non consecutive nodes in the ring. If overlapping faults hit nonconsecutive nodes
rapidly (i.e., faster than the time needed by the system to reach the next stable
configuration), each error is detected once, but due to the one-port model, the
upper bound on T (f) becomesR(1)+fB(n) = O(log2 n). Finally, in the unlikely
scenario where f quickly overlapping faults hit f consecutive nodes in the ring,
Theorem 1 provides the upper bound for T (f) ≤ R(f)+ f(f+1)2 B(n) = O(log
3n).
Remark About stabilization time: fT (f) is the maximum number of faults per
time unit that the algorithm can tolerate, still guaranteeing that we pass by a
stable configuration infinitely often. However, T (f) is not a period to optimize:
T (f) is just the time it takes, in the worst case, after f failures, for the ring to
be reconnected, and the failure information to be propagated to all alive nodes.
3.3 Non Stabilization Risk Control
To guarantee convergence within T (f) time units, Algorithm 1 assumes that
f ≤ blog(n)c− 1. In order to evaluate the risk behind this assumption, consider
that failures strike following an Exponential distribution of parameter λ. Let
PT (f) be the probability of the event “more than f failures strike within time
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Figure 3: Maximal value for δ to ensure that PT (M)(M) < 10
−9 with τ = 1µs and M =
blog2(n)c.
T”. Then PT (f) = 1− Σfk=0
(λT )k
k! e
−λT .
Consider a platform of n nodes: if µind is the MTBF of a single node, then
λ = nµind [14]. Let M = blog(n)c−1, the assumption that there will not be more
than M failures before stabilization is then true with probability 1−PT (M)(M).
In Figure 3, we represent this relation by showing the upper bound of δ to en-
force PT (M)(M) < 10
−9, at variable machines scale (n), and for different values
of µind, with a message time bound of τ = 1µs. Figure 3 illustrates that for
all values of δ lower than the bound shown for a given system size and individ-
ual node reliability, the probability that failures strike fast enough to prevent
Algorithm 1 from converging in T (f) is negligible (less than 0.000000001). As
already mentioned, this bound on δ is a loose upper bound, because the bound
on T (f) in Equation (1) is loose itself. Furthermore, it captures the risk that
enough failures would strike during stabilization time to make the appearance of
the worst-case scenario possible, even though this worst case scenario has itself
a very low probability of happening (as shown in Sections 4 and 5). Still, for
the largest platforms with n = 256, 000 nodes, we find that δ ≤ 22s for the most
pessimistic µind = 20 years, and δ ≤ 60s if µind = 45 years results in timely
convergence. With such large values, the detector generates negligible noise to
the applications, as shown in Section 5.3.
3.4 Failure detection with randomized protocols
In this section, we provide a comparison of our algorithm with randomized
protocols such as SWIM. We first provide some background in Section 3.4.1,
and then proceed to a detailed comparison in Section 3.4.2
3.4.1 Background
Failure detection techniques based on randomized protocols detect failures through
periodic observation rounds. Within a round, each node randomly chooses an-
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other node to observe. This entails the observer sending an are you alive? mes-
sage to the observed node and waiting for its answer. This pull technique (also
called pinging) is different from the push technique based on heartbeats [12]
and used in the deterministic algorithm of Section 2. Pinging is inherent to
randomly choosing the observed process because this latter process does not
know in advance whom to send its alive message to. Pinging is known to be less
efficient than using heartbeats [12] because it requires twice as many messages,
and leads to increasing the timeout, to accommodate for a round-trip message.
In fact, actual protocols such as SWIM [15, 16, 17] (see Section 6.1 for more
details), request than after a time-out, other processors are required by the
observer, say Pi, to ping the non responding process, say Pj . Specifically, k
randomly chosen processors (see [15, 16] for details on how to choose k) would
ping Pj on behalf of Pi and forward any answer back to Pi. Only after this
confirmation step would Pj ’s death become suspected. This confirmation step
is not needed in our framework, since we assume that network links are reliable
and we upper bound the time to transmit a message by the quantity τ .
A single observation round is not enough to detect failures with high proba-
bility. During a round, some nodes will not be observed, while other nodes will
receive many are you alive? messages from different observers, and will need to
answer them all. Setting the value of the time-out then becomes a complicated
task: indeed, to avoid false positives (alive nodes unduly suspected of death),
one has to account for the maximum number of are you alive? messages that
are received by the same node. The next section proposes a simplified analysis
of the number of rounds and time-out values needed to limit the risk of such
false positives.
Finally, just as with our algorithm, after detecting a failure, the knowledge
of that failure must be propagated to every alive node. In a nutshell, this
propagation can be done in many ways, including a reliable diffusion mechanism
similar to the one presented in this paper. Other solutions include using a gossip
mechanism flooding the network in logarithmic time, or piggybacking are you
alive? messages with the current knowledge of all dead processes, see [6] for
details.
3.4.2 Comparison
In this section we estimate the failure detection time for a randomized protocol.
We assume a platform with N = 100, 000 nodes and fix the risk of missing the
death of a node to 10−9. Note, this is the same value as the risk PT (M)(M)
used in Section 3.3; however, our deterministic algorithm detects a single failure
with probability 1, as long as the timeout value δ is correctly set. On the
contrary, the worst-case detection time of a randomized protocol is infinite, by
construction: there are some (very unlikely) scenarios in which a dead node will
never be pinged.
Consider a single observation round with N = 100, 000 nodes. The prob-
ability that a given node is not pinged is p(N) = (N−1N )
N−1 ≈ 0.367881. In
fact limN→∞ p(N) =
1
e , where e is the Euler constant, and
1
e ≈ 0.367894. The
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expected number of nodes that are not pinged within a round tends to Ne . With
N = 100, 000, expect that 36, 788 nodes will be ignored. Then how many rounds
are needed to guarantee that all nodes are pinged with probability 1 − 10−9?
The solution is x where p(N)x = 10−9, and by deriving, we obtain x ≈ 20.7, so
that 21 rounds are needed to achieve the desired probability.
We now have to account for contention within a round. As already men-
tioned, some nodes will not be pinged, while some others will be pinged several
times. What is the largest number L(N) of ping messages that a node will re-
ceive? Of course the largest number is L(N) = N − 1 if all nodes ping the same
one, but this is very unlikely, and we need to estimate L(N) with high proba-
bility. The problem can be modeled as a balls and bins problem [18], where we
throw N balls into N bins randomly and independently. The only difference is
that a given node does not ping itself, but this does not modify the analysis. It
is known [18, Chapter 5] that lnNln lnN ≤ L(N) ≤ 3
lnN
ln lnN with high probability
1 − 1N . Here we obtain 4.7 ≤ L(100, 000) ≤= 14.1, so we need to account for
at least 5 ping messages being possibly sent to the same node (simulations in
Section 4.3 show that in fact we need to account for up to 11 ping messages to
be on the safe side).
Altogether, this calls to multiplying the time-out for a round-trip message
by (at least) 5 to account for contention, and then by 21 to account for the
number of rounds, leading to a 100X increase. Altogether, with N = 100, 000,
we conclude that detection can be achieved with probability 10−9 only with a
huge time-out of magnitude two orders higher than that of our deterministic
algorithm.
4 Simulations
We conduct simulations and experiments to evaluate the performance of the
algorithm under different execution scenarios and parameter settings. We in-
stantiate the model parameters with realistic values taken from the literature.
The code for all algorithms and simulations is publicly available3 so that inter-
ested readers can build relevant scenarios of their choice. In this section, we
report simulation results. See Section 5 for experiments.
4.1 Simulation Settings
The discrete-event simulator imitates how the protocol of Algorithm 1 would
behave on a distributed machine of size n. Messages between a pair of alive
nodes in this machine take a uniformly distributed time in the interval (0, τ ].
Failures are injected following an exponential law of parameter λ = n/µind
(see Section 3.3). To generate a manageable amount of events, each heartbeat
message and the corresponding timeouts are not simulated, but the simulator
asserts that a timeout should have expired on the observer after the death of its
3http://icl.utk.edu/~herault/ijhpca-failure-detector.tgz
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emitter if the observer is alive at that time; otherwise, the observer’s observer
is going to react, following the protocol.
The simulator computes (i) the average time to reach a stable configuration
(all processes know all faults) starting from a configuration with a single failure
injected at time 0, (ii) the average time to reach a configuration where all
processes know about the initial failure, and (iii) the average number of failures
striking during the time it takes to reach a stable configuration over a set of
10,000 independent runs.
We consider two main scenarios for the simulations. In both scenarios, we
target a large scale machine (up to 256,000 computing nodes) with a low latency
interconnect (τ = 1µs). In the scenario LowNoise, we set the failure detector
so as to minimize the overhead in the failure free case: η is set to 10 seconds,
and δ to 1 minute. We consider this case significant for platforms where nodes
are expected to be reliable, or where alternative methods to detect most failures
exist; the heartbeat mechanism is then used as a last resort solution (e.g., when
special hardware providing a Baseboard Management Controller and controlled
through a protocol like IPMI [19] is connected to the application notification
system). We also considered a scenario LowLat, with the opposite assump-
tions, where active check through heartbeats is the primary method to detect
failures, and a low latency of detection is required for the application: η = 0.1s,
and δ = 1s.
4.2 Simulation Results
In Figure 4, we force the simulator to inject the maximum number of failures
tolerated by the algorithm for a given platform size (blog2(n)c − 1) in a very
short time, inferior to δ, in order to evaluate the average stabilization time in
the most volatile environment. Varying the system size (n), and the number of
injected failures simultaneously, we evaluate the time taken for the first failure
to be notified to all processes, and for all the processes to be notified of all the
failures that struck since the last stable configuration.
The figure considers scenario LowNoise. Points on the graph show times
reported by the simulator, while lines represent functions fitted to these points,
O( 1n + blog2(n)c) for all know all failures (orange lines), and O(
1
n ) for all know
the first failure (green lines).
In average, the first failure, striking at time 0, is detected δ− η2 seconds later,
and this is the observed base line for detecting the first failure at all nodes. The
reliable broadcast overhead in this case is negligible, because τ << δ and η.
There are a few executions in which, within the first δ seconds, another failure
hits the observer of the first failure, introducing another δ delay to actually
detect the first failure and broadcast it. As the size of the machine increases,
this probability decreases. Such overlapping failure cases contribute to a longer
detection and notification time that can be fitted with a function inversely pro-
portional to the platform size, but have a low probability to happen, introducing
a measurable but small overhead at small scale. For general stabilization, where
all processes need to know all failures, the reliable broadcast remains as fast as
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Figure 4: Average Stabilization Time, when the maximal number of failures strike a platform
of varying size.
for the initial failure. However, if any failure strikes before that broadcast phase
is complete, this delays reaching stabilization by another δ followed by a loga-
rithmic phase. As we observe in both figures, this shows at large scale, where
failures have a high probability of striking successively, each introducing a con-
stant overhead. The fitting function thus shows the same inversely proportional
property in the beginning, and then the logarithmic behavior starts to dominate
at large scale.
We conducted the same set of simulations on the LowLat scenario, but
cannot include them for lack of space. The evaluation presents the exact same
characteristics, shifted by the ratio between the two values for δ.
We then consider the average case, when failures are not forced to strike
quasi-simultaneously. We set the MTBF of independent components to a very
pessimistic value (µind = 1year), making the MTBF of the platform decrease
to a couple of minutes at 256,000 nodes. Although we do not expect such a
pessimistic value in real platforms, we evaluate this case in order to ensure
that failures may occur before the initial one is detected and broadcast (or
stabilization would be reached immediately after). Figure 5 presents the average
number of failures observed at different scales, the average time for all nodes to
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Figure 5: Average Stabilization Time, with random overlapping failures in scenario LowNoise
(δ = 1min, τ = 1µs, η = 10s), with µind = 1year.
know about the first failure, and the average time for all nodes to know about
all failures. Points represent values given by the simulator, while lines represent
fitting functions: O(1) for the time for all to know the first failure, O(n) for the
average number of failures and the average time for all to know all failures. We
present here the scenario LowNoise, although the result also holds for scenario
LowLat, at a different scale.
This figure shows that, on average, and even with extremely low MTBFs,
the probability that two independent failures hit the system in an overlapping
manner –before the first failure is known by all nodes– is very low. This happens
when the MTBF of the system becomes comparable to δ. In that case, the first
failure still takes close to a constant time to be notified to all. The reason is
that τ log2(n) remains very small compared to δ, and once the broadcast is
initiated, it completes in τ log2(n). The successive failures may strike anytime
between [0, δ], delaying the time to reach the stable configuration by another
δ + τ log2(n). On average, at 256,000 nodes, this happens in the middle of the
initial failure detection interval, delaying the completion by δ/2. Each failure,
however, is independent in that case, and each is detected almost δ time units
after it strikes.
4.3 Comparison with randomized protocols
Finally, in Figures 6 and 7, we use the discrete event simulation to expose the
quality of detection with randomized gossiping protocols, such as SWIM. As
described in Section 3.4.1, these protocols execute successive rounds. During a
round, a process randomly selects another one to ping and uses a push mech-
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anism to check if this selected process is still responsive. Determining when
a failure will be detected with such an approach is more subtle than for the
deterministic pull algorithm that we presented in this work. As mentioned in
Section 3.4.2, there are two main reasons for this:
• The duration of a round must be higher than the value of the timeout
to detect a failure. That value is a function of the network latency and
of the number of heartbeat requests messages that a single target can
receive during a single round. Otherwise, a process might suspect another
one falsely after it did not receive a heartbeat in time, not because the
target is not responsive, but because it is busy responding to other ping
requests.
• The number of rounds to ensure (with high probability) that all processes
have been probed needs to be determined. As processes select targets
independently, it is predictable that two (or more) processes select the
same target and thus –as each selects a single target– that some processes
are not observed during a single round.
To quantify these two parameters experimentally –in complement of the
theoretical study of Section 3.4.2–, we have simulated the behavior of a the
probing part of a randomized gossiping protocol like SWIM. We report the
following two critical measures:
• During a single probing round, where each alive process selects a single
target randomly and requests for a heartbeat, what is the maximal number
of processes –denoted as L(N) in Section 3.4.2, where N is the number of
processes– that select the same target? Figure 7 gives average values for
L(N).
• Figure 6 shows how many rounds are needed to ensure (with high proba-
bility) that all processes have been targeted at least once.
In both figures, we scale the system size, increasing the number of nodes, and
report these average and maximum numbers over 10,000 simulations per pa-
rameter.
In theory, the average largest number of processes that select the same target
during a single round is between lnNln lnN and 3
lnN
ln lnN , where N is the number of
processes (see Section 3.4.2). Simulations of Figure 7 are consistent with these
bounds, showing that up to 11 processes have a high probability to select the
same target during a random round at 100,000 nodes, and up to 8 processes
for a system of 20,000 nodes. This means that the timeout for the heartbeat
must be set to 16 to 22 times the maximum network latency, to ensure that
a non-responsive process has indeed failed, rather than being too congested by
messages to answer to the request in time. Comparatively, our solution deter-
ministically ensures that only one process will be pinged by another, thereby
eliminating the queue management pressure.
Similarly, Figure 6 shows that on average, between 11 rounds at 20,000 nodes
and 13 rounds at 100,000 nodes are necessary to ensure, with high probability,
that all nodes are targeted by at least another. If one considers the worst case,
over the 10,000 simulations considered, it is often necessary for at least one of
these executions to wait until 22 rounds are executed to reach all processes.
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Figure 6: Number of random probing
rounds to ensure that all nodes have been
detected by the randomized pinging proto-
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Figure 7: Average of the maximum length
of queue size L(N) during a single round,
for the randomized pinging protocol
Combining both factors, to detect with high probability the failure of a
single process in a system of 100,000 elements, on average, 13 rounds of 22
times the maximum network latency each would be necessary. During this time,
on average, 2,599,974 messages would have been exchanged over the network.
This is in stark contrast with the ring algorithm presented in this paper, which
provides a deterministic bound function of the number of failures,. It would
detect the failure in one maximum network latency and see 99,999 heartbeat
messages (one per alive process).
5 Experimental Evaluation
This section presents an experimental evaluation of an operational implemen-
tation of the proposed failure detector on the Titan ORNL supercomputer. We
have implemented the failure detection and propagation service in the reference
implementation of the User-Level Failure Mitigation (ULFM) draft MPI stan-
dard [4], provided by Open MPI. ULFM is an extension of the MPI standard
that empowers MPI users –applications, library developers, or parallel program-
ming languages– to provide their own fault-tolerant strategy. ULFM defines a
set of additional API to MPI that permits: (i) the interruption of MPI oper-
ations that cannot complete due to the occurrence of failures through raising
appropriate MPI error classes; (ii) the continuation of point-to-point MPI mes-
saging between non failed processes after such error classes have been raised;
(iii) the interruption of MPI operations at all ranks in a particular communica-
tion handle (e.g., MPI COMM REVOKE, MPI WIN REVOKE, MPI FILE REVOKE), under
the explicit control of the programmer; (iv) the fault-tolerant validation of algo-
rithmic steps (MPI COMM AGREE); and (v) the recovery of full-operational capabil-
ities (including the ability to perform collective communications) by construct-
ing replacements for damaged communication objects (with MPI COMM SHRINK
and MPI COMM SPAWN to recreate isomorphic communicators, and then derive
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windows and files as necessary). The general design of ULFM relies on lo-
cal semantics: the user is notified of failure only in MPI calls that involve a
failed process, and a correct ULFM implementation will try to make all opera-
tions succeed if it can complete locally. Although this relaxed design eases the
implementation requirements and delivers higher failure-free performance, the
fact that a failure is guaranteed to be detected only after an active reception
from the dead process can lead to an increase of latency during failure recov-
ery operations, because the same process failures may be detected sequentially
by multiple processes, possibly at a much later time than when they were first
reported. Moreover, several routines imply necessarily a communicator-wide
knowledge of failures. Operations like MPI COMM AGREE and MPI COMM SHRINK
need to build consistent knowledge on (sub)sets of acknowledged failures; a
pending point-to-point reception from any source must eventually raise an error
if it cannot complete because of the death of a processor. Therefore, the addi-
tion of the failure detection and propagation service provides an acceleration to
such scenarios by eliminating delayed local observation of the failure, which can
then be immediately reported to the upper-level, which can in turn act upon it
quickly.
5.1 Implementation
The failure detector has two components: the observation ring, and the propa-
gation overlay. The components operate on a group of processes that must be
MPI consistent (i.e., identical at all ranks). The propagation topology is imple-
mented at the Byte Transport Layer (BTL) level, which provides the portable
low-level transport abstraction in Open MPI.
The propagation overlay takes advantage of the Active Message behavior
of the Open MPI BTL’s. Each message, with a size lesser than the “eager”
protocol switch point, contains the index of the callback function to be analyzed
by upon reception. This approach provides independence from the MPI seman-
tic (including matching). Upon the reception of a propagation message, the
message is forwarded according to two possible algorithms. In the case where
the overlay is not corrected to incorporate the knowledge about failed processes
and thus the group can be considered as an invariant during the entire execu-
tion, the message is forwarded as is through the propagation topology which
is constructed every time a broadcast is initiated, according to the algorithm
presented in Section 2, in order to guarantee the logarithmic propagation delay.
When the upper level declares –through a runtime parameter– that it repairs its
communicators after every stabilization phase, the reliable propagation overlay
can reduce the size of the messages to include only the latest detected failures,
and the overlay is then built considering all processes of the group.
The observation ring is also built at the BTL level. The emission of the
heartbeats poses a particular challenge in practice. The timely activation and
delivery of heartbeats is critically important in enforcing the perfection of the
detector, and the bound on τ . Missing its η emission period deadlines puts the
emitter process at risk of becoming suspected by its observer, even though it
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is still alive. If the heartbeats are emitted from the application context, they
can only be sent when the application enters MPI routines, and consequently, a
compute intensive MPI application would often miss the η period. In our imple-
mentation, the heartbeats are emitted from within a separate, library internal
thread, to render their emission independent from the application’s communica-
tion pattern. For ease of implementation, the MPI THREAD MULTIPLE support is
enabled by default when the detector thread is enabled; however, future software
releases will drop this requirement. An intricate issue also arises from a negative
interaction between the emission and the reception of heartbeat messages. To
check the liveliness of the emitter process (after the δ timeout), the observer
has to see if it has received heartbeats. From an implementation perspective,
if the heartbeats are sent through the “eager” channel, the detector thread
(the receive thread in this case) has to be active and poll the BTL engine for
progress. However, if the application has posted operations on large messages,
the poll operation may start progressing these (long) operations before return-
ing control to the detector thread, leading to an unsafe delay in the emission of
heartbeats from that same thread. To circumvent that difficulty, the detector
thread emits heartbeats using the “RDMA put” channel. Heartbeats are thus
directly deposited by raising a flag in the registered memory at the receiver,
using hardware accelerated put operations that do not require active polling.
The observer can then simply check that the flag has been raised during the last
δ period with a local load operation, and reset the flag with a local store, which
are mostly impervious to noise and do not delay the η period. This approach
also allows the observer to miss δ periods without endangering the correctness
of the protocol (only increasing the time to detect and notify the failure, but no
triggering a false positive).
5.2 Experimental Conditions
The experiments are carried out on the Titan ORNL Supercomputer [20], a
Cray XK7 machine with 16-core AMD Opteron processors and the Cray Gem-
ini interconnect. The ULFM MPI implementation is based on a pre-release of
Open MPI 2.x (r#6e6bbfd), which supports the optimized uGNI and shared-
memory transports (without XPmem), and uses the Tuned collective module.
The MPI implementation is compiled with the MPI THREAD MULTIPLE support.
Every experiment is repeated 30 times and we present the average. The bench-
marks are deployed with one MPI rank per core, and all threads of an MPI
process are bound to that same core (application, detector, and driver threads
when applicable, i.e., the detector thread does not require exclusive compute
resources).
5.3 Noise and Accuracy
The first set of experiments investigate the noise generated by the detector and
its accuracy for different workloads when η and δ vary, in a method similar
to [11] that focused exclusively on measuring the noise generated by different
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Figure 8: Sensitivity to noise resulting from the failure detector activity for varied workloads.
failure detection strategies. The η and δ periods are set so that δ = 10 × η. If
the test is successful (that is, no failure was detected, since none was injected
in this experiment), then η is reduced, and the experiment is repeated, until a
false positive is reported. We also collect the number of times an η deadline
was missed, even when the δ timeout is still respected. We first considered a
non communicative, compute-only MPI application where each rank calls LA-
PACK DGEMM operations on local matrices, without calling MPI routines for
extended periods of time. Without the detector thread, the non communica-
tive benchmark reports false detections for all considered values of η. With the
detector thread, this non-communicative benchmark succeeds until η is set to
one millisecond. However, starting from η < 5 milliseconds, messages indicating
a missed η deadline are occasionally issued (although the δ timeout is still re-
spected). These observations are consistent with the scheduling time quantums
(sched min granularity is set to 3ms), and indicate that the thread schedul-
ing latency is an absolute for the minimum η period. Smaller periods could be
achieved with a real time scheduler, but such capabilities call to administrative
privileges, which is an undesirable requirement.
Next, in Figure 8 we present the noise incurred on a variety of commu-
nication, and computation workloads, provided by the Intel MPI Benchmark
(version 4.1), and HPL (version 2.2), respectively. Accuracy results are simi-
lar overall in the communicative benchmarks. All tests of the IMB-MPI1 suite
can run without false detection for η ≥ 10ms. Notably, point-to-point only
benchmarks can succeed with η value as low as 2.5ms but occasionally report
false suspicions. Collective communication benchmarks are more sensitive and
report occasional heartbeat emission deadline misses until η ≥ 25ms, due to
contentions on the access to hardware network resources.
The latency performance (left graph) and bandwidth performance (center
graph) are barely affected by low frequencies of heartbeat emissions. For higher
frequencies, the overhead generated by the noise can reach approximately 10%.
The bandwidth performance is less impacted overall than the latency, especially
for point-to-point bandwidth, which remains unchanged for all but the most ex-
treme values of η. The application performance (Linpack, right graph) exhibits
no observable performance degradation for η ≥ 100ms. For higher frequencies,
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Figure 9: Detection and propagation delay compared to using the SWIM randomized failure
detector from Memberlist.
the performance degradation remains contained under 2%.
5.4 Comparison with SWIM
Figure 9 compares the detection delay (i.e., the stabilization delay) between the
MPI failure detector and the SWIM failure detection, after a failure occurs at
some process. For the MPI benchmark, after synchronizing, the desired num-
ber of MPI processes (whose ranks are chosen at random) simulate a failure.
Any other process posts an any-source reception. When the reception raises
a process failure exception (the only possible outcome for this non-matched
any-source reception), the process counts the number of locally known failed
processes, and if it does not contain all injected failures, it repeats the recep-
tion. The SWIM benchmark also employs MPI to synchronize before injecting
failures, however the SWIM algorithm implementation –we used Go-Memberlist
(r#d16b8b73)– is not integrated with MPI, and consequently the SWIM bench-
mark reports failure detections directly through Go-Memberlist callbacks. In
both cases (MPI and SWIM), the time at which all failures have been locally
observed is reported at each rank. On the Titan platform, the Memberlist ini-
tialization over the ipogif interface (i.e., the IP emulation layer over uGNI)
suffers from a connection storm, and consequently often fails to initialize with
more than 32 processes. A similar outcome has been observed on a different
Linux cluster (called Dancer, a 32 nodes, 8 cores per node Xeon 7550, Ether-
net Gigabit platform), but on that machine, the issue can be remediated by
disabling the IP connection tracking kernel module (which supports iptables
rules). With the contrack nf module disabled, the message absorption rate is
sufficient for the Memberlist benchmark to initialize and run to completion up
to the maximum 256 processes that can be tested without oversubscription on
that platform. Note that disabling the connection tracking module requires ad-
ministrative privileges, and severely limits the security of the system. Figure 9
therefore presents results on the dancer platform, using TCP as the transport
layer for both Memberlist and MPI.
The Memberlist implementation presents two variants of the SWIM proto-
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col. The first one is the pure SWIM protocol, which relies exclusively on UDP
heartbeats for both detecting and propagating the known suspected processes.
Heartbeats are requested from random processes at the beginning of every pe-
riod. The answer contains the list of currently suspected processes. If no answer
is received before the timeout, the observed process itself becomes suspect. The
second one expands on the SWIM protocol with the addition of requesting TCP
handshakes with processes whose UDP heartbeats are not received in time, and
a periodic gossiping (with a random gossip algorithm) of the list of suspected
processes. We refer to this optimization as PP&G, for the Push-Pull and Gossip
optimizations.
On the left graph in Figure 9, with 256 processes, the difference between pure
SWIM and SWIM PP&G is minor. The PP&G optimization closes the spread
between the first process suspecting a failure and the failure being reported
at all processes (shaded area), especially so for smaller values of η, resulting in
marginally better stabilization delays. For values of η lower than 100ms, (which
are, arguably, orders of magnitude more demanding than the default values
selected for WAN SWIM deployments), false positive detections are reported
for all variants of SWIM; the underlying reason lies in the loss of UDP messages
due to occasional collisions; the failover TCP mechanism in the PP&G variant
takes longer to establish the TCP connexion than the detection timeout, which
negates its advantages for such aggressive timeouts.
On the contrary, the ULFM failure detector is accurate for the entire range of
η values (still subject to the kernel scheduler time quantum limitation discussed
in the previous section). The spread between the first process detection and the
stabilization delay is insignificant except for the smallest η considered, where
it remains small nonetheless. Thanks to its deterministic behavior, the ULFM
failure detector can remain accurate while reporting failures significantly faster
than the SWIM algorithm employing the same heartbeat frequency. One has
to consider that the number of messages exchanged for each heartbeat period
is double in SWIM: after each heartbeat period, each process in the SWIM
topology sends an observation request to a randomly selected process. This
random selection process has the potential of creating hotspots, whenever many
processes select to observe the same neighbor, which in turn increases the risk
of message loss and consequently the risk of a false positive. Meanwhile, in
our failure detector, a single message is sent, with a constant input and output
degree degree of one.
On the right graph of Figure 9, we compare the scalability of the detector
with regard to the number of deployed processes. We selected the best perform-
ing PP&P variant for SWIM, and employed the smallest safe value of η for each
detector (which incidentally means that the η value for ULFM is smaller, thanks
to its algorithm reporting fewer false positives). For a smaller number of pro-
cesses, the ULFM failure detector is stabilizing in approximately 100ms, while
the SWIM algorithm stabilizes in 1.4s. As the number of processes increases,
the ULFM failure detector remains stable at 100ms, while the stabilization de-
lay of SWIM increases to over 2s, an effect of the suspicion time-out, which is
a logarithmic (in number of processes) delay added to the SWIM protocol to
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Figure 10: Detection and propagation delay, and impact on completion time of fault-tolerant
agreement operation.
reduce the number of false positives.
5.5 Failure Detection Time at Scale
Figure 10 presents the behavior observed when injecting failures at scale. The
first graph (left) presents the time to reach a stable state when injecting 1 to
8 failures for a varying number of nodes. We observe that for small scales, the
reported delay is consistently close to δ. If emitters were sending heartbeats to
their observer at random starting time, we would expect the detection time to be
closer to δ − η/2; however, as all processes start to sending heartbeats to their
observer at the end of the MPI Init function, they are almost synchronized,
and for all runs we observe a consistent delay at small scale. At larger scale,
processes leave MPI Init at a more variable date, and the average starts to
converge toward the theoretical bound. This observation matches the model,
considering that in this scenario all failures are “simultaneous”, and that the
random allocation of failures has a low probability of hurting observer/emitter
pairs. Consequently, the detection and propagation of each of these failures
progress concurrently and do not suffer from the cumulative effect of detecting
multiple predecessors’ failures on the ring.
The second experiment (center in Figure 10) investigates the effect of col-
lisions on the reliable broadcast propagation delay. The benchmark is similar
to the previous experiment, except that before a process simulates a failure, it
sends its observer a special “trigger heartbeat,” which initiates an immediate
propagation reporting it dead, without waiting for the δ timeout. The rest of
the observation protocol remains unchanged (i.e., heartbeats are exchanged be-
tween alive processes with an η period, and the observer of the injection process
switches to observing the predecessor). We then present the increase in the
average duration of the reliable broadcast when multiple broadcasts are pro-
gressing concurrently. To simplify the proof of the upper bound on stabilization
time (Theorem 1), we have considered that successive broadcasts are totally se-
quential. This is an admittedly pessimistic hypothesis, and indeed, performing
two concurrent propagations does not significantly increase the delay, as the two
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reliable broadcasts can actually overlap almost completely. However, starting
from 4, and, more prominently, for 8 concurrent broadcasts, the average comple-
tion time is significantly increased. Considering the small size of the messages,
the bandwidth requirements are small, and contention on port access is indeed
the major cause of the imperfect overlap between these concurrent broadcasts,
therefore vindicating the importance of considering a port-limited model during
the design of the failure detector and propagation algorithms.
The last experiment (right in Figure 10) presents the performance of the
agreement algorithm after failures have been injected. The authors of [3] pre-
sented a similar performance result for their agreement algorithm. In their
results, the agreement performance was severely impacted when failure were
discovered during the agreement (with the failure free performance of 80µs in-
creasing to approximatively 80ms), an effect the authors claim is due to failure-
detection overhead. In their work, failure detection was delegated to an ORTE-
based RAS service, responsible for detecting and propagating failures. In this
experiment, we strive to recreate as closely as possible this setup, except that
we deploy our failure detector in lieu of the ORTE RAS service. We consider
the same implementation of the agreement on 6,000 Titan cores (the same num-
ber of cores they deployed on the generally similar Cray XC30 Darter system).
Some in-band detection capabilities are active, in particular, failure of shared-
memory sibling ranks are reported by the node’s local operating system. With
the replacement of the ORTE RAS service by our failure detector algorithm,
the time to completion of the agreement algorithm decreases to below 1.5ms (a
50x improvement). This is due to the faster propagation of failure knowledge
among the agreement participants: instead of waiting for (long) in-band time-
outs or ORTE RAS notification, a process whose parent or children have failed
can observe the condition much earlier, and start the on-line mending of the
fan-in/fan-out tree topology at an earlier date. Interestingly, previously hidden
performance issues become visible, as failure detection is not the dominant cost
anymore: we observe that the performance of the agreement decreases linearly
with the number of detected failures, a behavior that can be attributed to the
agreement algorithm performing a linear scanning of the group when a failure
is reported.
6 Related work
In this section, we survey related work on failure detectors and then on fault-
tolerant broadcast algorithms.
6.1 Failure detectors
A number of failure detection (FD) algorithms have been proposed in the liter-
ature. Most current implementations of FDs are based on an all-to-all commu-
nication approach where each node periodically sends heartbeat messages to all
nodes. Because they consider a fully connected set of known nodes that com-
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municate in an all-to-all manner, these implementations are not appropriate for
platforms equipped with a large number of nodes.
Several efforts have been made towards scaling up failure detectors imple-
mentations. In [21], Bertier et al. introduce a hierarchical organization suitable
for grid configurations. They define a two-level organization to reduce message
overhead. Local groups are cluster nodes, bound together by a global inter-
cluster group. Every local group elects one leader that is member in the global
group. Within each group any member monitors all other members. While
hierarchical approaches provide short local detection time, the cost of reconfig-
uration and the propagation of failure information both remain high. Larrea
et al. [22] also aim to diminish the amount of exchanged information in order
to scale up. To do so, they use a logical ring to structure message exchanges.
Thus, the number of messages to detect failures is minimal, but the time for
propagating failure information is linear in the number of nodes.
An alternative approach for implementing scalable failure detectors is to
use gossip-like protocols where nodes randomly choose a few other nodes with
whom they exchange their failure information [23, 15]. The idea is that, with
high probability, eventually all nodes obtain every piece of information. The
work of van Renesse et al. [23] is one of the pioneering implementations of
gossip-style failure detectors. In their basic protocol, each node maintains a
list with a heartbeat counter for each known node. Periodically, every node
increments its own counter and selects a random node which to send its list.
A disadvantage is that the size of gossip messages grows with the size of the
network, which induces a high network traffic. The authors identified a variant
specifically designed for large scale distributed systems: the multilevel gossiping.
They concentrate the traffic within subsets of nodes to improve the scalability.
In [24], Hayashibara et al. explore a hybrid approach based both on dynamic
clustering to solve the scalability issue and on the gossiping technique to remove
wrong suspicions. In [25], Horita et al. present another scalable failure detector
that creates scattered monitoring relations among nodes. Each node is intended
to be monitored by a small number k of other nodes (with k set typically to 4
or 5). When a node dies, one of the monitoring nodes will detect the failure
and propagate this information across the whole system. SWIM [16] scales by
using a probabilistic approach: nodes randomly choose a subset of neighbors
to probe. To avoid false suspicions, SWIM relies on a collaborative approach.
An initiator node invites k other nodes to form a group, pings them and waits
for their replies. If a node does not reply in time, the initiator then judges this
node as suspicious, and asks the other group members to check the potentially
faulty node. More recently Tock et al. propose in [26] a scalable member-
ship service based on a hierarchical fast unreliable failure detection mechanism,
where failure information can be lost, combined with a slower gossip-protocol
for eventual information dissemination. Finally, Katti et al. [6] design a scalable
failure detector based on observing random nodes and gossiping information. In
their protocol, each ping message transmits information on all currently known
failures, either via a liveness matrix or in compressed form.
Practically, gossip approaches bring along redundant failure information
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which degrades their scalability. Furthermore, the randomization used by gossip
protocols makes the definition of timeout values difficult, since the monitoring
sets change often over time. In order to eventually avoid false detections, these
techniques tend to oversize their timeouts, which results in longer detection
times. Theoretically, gossip approaches introduce random detection and propa-
gation times, whose worst-case with a prescribed risk factor are hard to bound4.
In contrast, our algorithm follows a deterministic detection and propagation
topology with (i) constant-size heartbeats and well-defined delays, (ii) a single
observer, (iii) a logarithmic-time propagation, and (iv) a guaranteed worst-time
to stabilization, thereby achieving all the goals of randomized methods with a
deterministic implementation.
6.2 Fault-Tolerant Broadcast
Fault-tolerant broadcasting algorithms have been extensively studied, and we
refer the reader to the surveys in [27, 28]. A key-concept is the fault-tolerant
diameter of the interconnection graph, which is defined as the maximum length
of the longest path in the graph when a given number of (arbitrarily chosen)
nodes have failed [29]. The main objective in this context is to identify classes
of overlay networks whose fault-tolerant diameter is close to their initial (fault-
free) diameter, even when allowing a number of failures close to their minimal
degree (allowing more failures than the minimal degree could disconnect the
graph). Furthermore, these overlay networks should provide enough vertex-
disjoint paths for broadcast algorithms to resist that many failures.
Research has concentrated on regular graphs (where all vertices have the
same degree): hypercubes [29, 13, 30], binomial graphs [31] or circulant net-
works [32]. For all these graphs, efficient broadcast algorithms have been pro-
posed. These algorithms tolerate a number of failures up to their degree minus
one, and execute within a number of steps (in the one-port model) that does
not exceed twice their original diameter. However, to the best of our knowledge,
such algorithms require the number of nodes in the graph to be a power of two,
or a constant times a power of two, while we need an algorithm for an arbitrary
number of nodes. This motivates our solution based upon a double diffusion
(see Section 2).
7 Conclusion
Failure detection is a critical service for resilience. The failure detector pre-
sented in this work relies on heartbeats, timeouts, and communication bounds
to provide a reliable solution that works at scale, independently of the type of
faults that create permanent node failures. Our study reveals a complicated
trade-off between system noise, detection time, and risks: a low detection time
4Absolute worst-case times are infinite, as some nodes could be observed only after an
unbounded delay. See the discussion of Section 3.4.
Inria
A Failure Detector for HPC Platforms 31
would demand a low latency in the detection of failures, thus a tight approxima-
tion of the communication bound, increasing the risk of a false positive, and a
frequent emission of heartbeat messages, increasing the system noise generated
by the failure detector. We proposed a scalable algorithm capable of tolerat-
ing high frequency failures, and proved a theoretical upper bound to the time
required to reconfigure the system in a state that allows new failures to strike;
therefore the algorithm can tolerate an arbitrary number of failures, provided
that they do not strike with higher frequency. The algorithm was implemented
in a resilient MPI distribution, which we used to assess its performance and im-
pact on applications at large scale. The performance evaluation shows that for
reasonable values of detection time, the ring strategy for detection introduces a
negligible or non measurable amount of additional noise in the system, while the
high-performance reliable broadcast strategy for notification allows for quickly
disseminating the fault information, once detected by the observing process.
Implementation considerations lead us to advocate that the detection part of
the service should be provided at a lower levels of the software stack, either inside
the operating system or inside the interconnect hardware. Active heartbeats
to probe the activity of remote nodes could be handled by these lower levels
without measurable noise, and with tighter bounds, since the other levels of the
software stack would not introduce additional components to the noise. Future
work should focus on providing this capability and on evaluating the approach
to address the trade-off between detection time and risk.
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